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May 19, 2009 1 Introduction
The topic of trade agreements is a broad one. We will de￿ne trade agree-
ments as agreements concerning nations￿treatment of goods, services, or
factors of production as these cross borders or have the potential of a⁄ecting
the economic welfare of foreign nationals. This means, of course, that trade
agreements are ubiquitous. Parties to agreements may be national govern-
ments or non-government entities such as producers or consumers. Parties
may also be international organizations or supra-national political or eco-
nomic institutions.
Trade agreements may be explicit or implicit. They may be simple or
complex. They may be long-term or be associated with an immediate and
one-time transaction. Trade agreements may specify prices, quantities, or
policies such as tari⁄s, subsidies, quotas, content, standards, or even detailed
conditions on behavior, such as competition.
Trade agreements may re￿ ect an attempt by national governments to
maximize some well-de￿ned objective function. Such a function may be de-
￿ned exclusively over national income, or it may have as arguments income of
one or more special interest groups with the relative weighting of each group￿ s
income re￿ ecting political in￿ uence through parliamentary processes, contri-
3butions or lobbying, or re￿ ecting some social preference for income distribu-
tion. Indeed, parties to trade agreements may have any type of preferences
that re￿ ect the economic and political reality of each party￿ s domestic con-
ditions including social norms. As is known from social choice theory, such
￿aggregation￿may well lead to criterion functions that are not consistent
with standard axioms of rational conduct. This would suggest that it may
at times be di¢ cult to associate international trade strategies or agreements
with any simple national criterion.
A positive theory of trade agreements would seek to develop a framework
that would generate the trade agreements that we observe. A normative
theory of trade agreements would help identify deals that would raise welfare,
however de￿ned, of the participants. Such deals may specify new policies or
even institutions, and thus be de novo, or they may specify gradual changes
in policies or institutions if there are economic, political, or technological
barriers to change.
We will con￿ne our review to a consideration of recent work that assumes
that each national government seeks to maximize national income. We do
so for two reasons: First, the assumption that national governments seek to
maximize income has been and remains the standard assumption in trade
4theory. Secondly, the classical case for the attractiveness of free trade is
that it maximizes total world income. From the perspective of standard
welfare economics, distributional concerns are best addressed with explicitly
redistributive policies rather than with trade policies. In other words, free
trade with appropriate redistribution policies welfare dominates policies that
distort trade. Therefore, as long as higher income is desirable, i.e., as long as
it raises utility, which surely is the case for the vast majority of the world￿ s
population, national income would serve as an important metric.1
In section 2, we present the welfare calculus for national income in a
general equilibrium environment with perfect competition. We present two
versions of the national economic welfare calculus: one for analyzing changes
in economic welfare when underlying changes are small, and one for changes
in economic welfare when underlying changes are discrete. These approaches
are mutually consistent, and we will refer to both as the terms-of-trade and
volume-of-trade approach. We show in the remaining part of the paper how
each expression can be used to answer key questions on trade agreements.
In section 3, we apply this welfare calculus to preferential trade agree-
ments. Establishing new or expanding already existing preferential trade
1For an example of work that assumes that policies are a⁄ected by lobbies, see Gene
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1995).
5areas is a very active area of policy making ￿since the early 1990s, a remark-
able 432 new preferential agreements were noti￿ed to the WTO.2
In section 4, we apply the welfare calculus to multilateral liberalization.
We consider both results on how gradual reform as well as on discrete reform
could be utilized to reach global free trade. In sections 3 and 4 we will
also discuss results from computable general equilibrium models on trade
agreements. Some of these models have cast light on orders of magnitude of
welfare e⁄ects as well as informed theoretical developments.
It is a long-standing and recognized challenge for trade agreements that
there has traditionally not been an external enforcement mechanism, such as
for example a court, to ensure that nations put in practice that to which they
have agreed. Thus parties to agreements must rely on themselves to ensure
that agreements are upheld which, in turn, implies that countries might not
wish to enter into agreements that it will be di¢ cult to enforce. Agreements
should be self-enforcing. In section 5 we consider some results that emphasize
this constraint and hence the types of agreements we would expect to observe
nations to establish. We conclude, in section 6, that the welfare analyses
2See http://www.wto.org. We de￿ne the types of agreements provided by GATT, in
particular, customs unions, free trade areas, and preferential agreements, in section 3 of
this paper.
6in sections 3 to 4 and the analysis on self-enforcing agreements in section
5 are complementary. We also identify some questions for further research.
Throughout the paper, we will also discuss results from computable general
equilibrium models on trade agreements. These models have been helpful in
casting light on orders of magnitude of welfare e⁄ects as well as in informing
theoretical developments.
2 National Economic Welfare in Perfect Com-
petition
Consider a world of n countries, each indexed by i (i = 1, ..., n), where
price-taking consumers and producers trade a ￿nite number of goods k with
price-taking producers and consumers in other countries. If mi denotes
country i￿ s vector of net imports, and if pe is the corresponding vector of
prices paid to foreign exporters or received by domestic exporters, and if pi
is the corresponding vector of domestic prices in country i; then pi ￿ pe is a
vector of trade taxes or subsidies, with elements ti
j (j = 1, ..., k) if rates are
speci￿c, or with elements ￿i
jpe
j if rates are ad valorem.
It follows from the balanced trade condition that spending equals domes-
7tic income plus tari⁄ revenue, that the change in real income of the repre-
sentative consumer in country i, d￿i; measured in units of a numØraire good,








Thus the change in real income is the sum of a terms-of-trade e⁄ect,
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This expression states the welfare change as the sum of a terms-of-trade
e⁄ect, ￿mi
A￿pe; where ￿pe = pe
B￿pe
A; a tari⁄-revenue e⁄ect, (pi
B￿pe
B)￿mi;
where ￿mi = mi
B ￿ mi
A; and the non-negative e¢ ciency e⁄ect, Si:4
We refer to analyses drawing on either expression (1) or (2) as the terms-
of-trade and volume-of-trade approach. In the general equilibrium theory
of trade agreements, the small change expression (1) has proved useful for
generating optimal tari⁄results, and for yielding the sign of change in welfare
from any proposed policy reform and thus results on directions of desirable
reform. The discrete change expression (2) o⁄ers exact welfare estimates of
policy changes and has been used to compare di⁄erent liberalization strate-
gies, including customs unions and free trade.
3 Preferential Trade Agreements
While GATT/WTO emphasizes non-discrimination between its members,
GATT Article XXIV allows WTO members to form free trade areas, which
4See Michihiro Ohyama (1972) or Earl Grinols and Kar-yiu Wong (1991) for a derivation
of this expression.
9eliminate the barriers on mutual trade between the free trade area members
while leaving each member￿ s tari⁄s on its trade with non-members to that
member country to decide, or customs unions, which eliminate the barriers
to mutual trade on the union members while setting common external tari⁄s
on trade with non-members.5
Traditional analysis of preferential arrangements has been cast in terms
of the trade diversion and trade creation approach pioneered by Jacob Viner
(1950). Unfortunately, as discussed in Kowalczyk (1990, 2000), this approach
is imprecise and incomplete, and it does not o⁄er a strategy for empirical
work. We apply instead the terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade approach
to the welfare of preferential agreements. It is analytically convenient, and
has none of the shortcomings of the traditional approach, in particular it is
both consistent and complete, and it involves variables that are meaningful
for empirical analysis.
Consider ￿rst the question of a small country￿ s trade policy strategy.
Many of the world￿ s free trade agreements or customs unions have one or
more small countries as parties. Yet, conventional trade theory had that a
5Additional requirements are that internal barriers must be eliminated on "substan-
tially all trade" and that the average rate of protection on trade with non-members must
not increase. Unilateral, discriminatory liberalization is also provided for if at least one
of the parties is a developing country.
10small country￿ s best trade policy is unilateral free trade. Paul Wonnacott
and Ronald Wonnacott (1981) showed that a small country, in a world where
preferential trade agreements are possible, would prefer a free trade agree-
ment with a large country to unilateral free trade, since the large country￿ s
preferential tari⁄ reduction bene￿ts the small country. However, the large
country would lose from the arrangement. Kowalczyk (2000) formalizes the
analysis and shows that the extra bene￿t for the small country is due to a
terms-of-trade improvement from the large country￿ s tari⁄ reduction. The
paper shows also that a small country may even prefer membership in many
free trade agreements with several di⁄erent large countries and it shows that
equi-proportionate gradual tari⁄ reductions between the small country and
its large partners may o⁄er higher welfare at every step until internal free
trade has been established. The paper shows, ￿nally, that while indeed the
large country would lose from the free trade agreement￿ s implied terms-of-
trade worsening, the total net gain to the small and large partners is positive
due to the small country￿ s own tari⁄reduction, and hence the small country
can o⁄er a sidepayment to the large country equal to the large country￿ s
terms-of-trade loss in return for an o⁄er to enter into a free trade agreement.
With this incentive for small countries to seek preferential agreements,
11and if appropriate sidepayments are applied, it is possible that a large coun-
try would be willing to sign free trade agreements with many small countries.6
Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) show how this would lead to a world trad-
ing system of overlapping hubs-and-spokes structures: a layer of agreements
due to each small country seeking access to many large markets ￿and thus
each small country becoming a hub ￿and a layer as each large country would
become a hub with many small country spokes.
Their analysis holds implications for the long-standing question of the
relative desirability of free trade areas versus customs unions: Each large hub
country may prefer a large rather than a small number of small country spokes
since liberalizing with a collection of small spokes could be like liberalizing
with a larger country and hence imply a smaller terms-of-trade loss for the
large hub country. However, if the agreements are signed sequentially, an
early small country spoke might seek to prevent the addition of new spokes
since these may lead to worse terms of trade for the early spoke by the
implied preference erosion. Due to the common external tari⁄, expansion of
customs unions often require unanimity amongst members while free trade
6In more general environments, small countries might obtain free trade agreements with
large countries in return for cooperation in other areas such as, for example, taxation, anti-
trust, migration, health, the environment, labor standards, product standards, or defense.
12areas do not. Hence, to avoid a hold-up situation on further expansion, the
large country would prefer free trade areas rather than customs unions as a
vehicle for extending preferential access.
In an explicit exploration of the role of country size, Michael Michaely
(1998) proposes that size be measured by the small country￿ s potential ex-
ports as a share in the large country￿ s total demand. Given this de￿nition, he
shows that the large country￿ s welfare loss is bell-shaped as a function of the
small country￿ s size. A free trade agreement with a micro-state has virtually
no e⁄ect on the large country￿ s welfare, nor would a free trade agreement with
a "large" small country where the terms-of-trade loss for the large country
would be only small. The largest loss would be from integrating with an
intermediate size small country. Kowalczyk (2008), by using equation (2) in
this paper, derives an upper limit on the welfare loss for the large country
to be two times the tari⁄ revenue it earns on its initial trade with the small
country.
The WTO provides not only for free trade areas and customs unions,
but also for higher income countries to extend preferential access without
requesting developing country liberalization in return. Assuming the devel-
oping country to be a small country, Kowalczyk (2006) shows that while a
13free trade agreement with a large country would yield the highest welfare
for the small country, the welfare ranking for the small country of one-sided
preferential access to the large country market versus its own unilateral liber-
alization is ambiguous. From expressions (1) or (2) in this paper, the ranking
would depend on whether the implied terms-of-trade gains without domestic
liberalization would o⁄er a larger welfare improvement than eliminating own
barriers which in turn are functions of the initial rate of protection and the
developing country￿ s own trade elasticities. The paper also establishes a new
result that adds to concerns that preferential liberalization may make global
free trade di¢ cult to achieve: following a granting of preferential access to
the small country, the large country would lose even more from subsequent
small country unilateral liberalization. This is because such liberalization
would expand the small country￿ s trade with the large country which would
lose even more tari⁄revenue on its imports from its non-preferential partners.
When some countries integrate in free trade areas or customs unions, what
are the e⁄ects on non-member countries? In an attempt by the framers of
GATT to restrict member nations￿ability to use free trade areas or customs
unions to extract better terms of trade from non-members, Article XXIV
includes a stipulation that the average external tari⁄ of members, upon in-
14tegration, may not increase. However, this restriction is not su¢ cient to
ensure that there are no spill-overs onto non-members.
Jaroslev Vanek (1965) introduced the notion of the compensating common
external tari⁄ of a customs union as the rate that would leave the economic
welfare of non-members una⁄ected. Michihiro Ohyama (1972) and Murray
Kemp and Henry Wan (1976) demonstrate that not only do such tari⁄s and
hence customs unions exist in a standard competitive world economy but also
that there exist within-union sidepayments such that no member country
would be worse o⁄ from joining or expanding such a union. An important
corollary is that global free trade could be reached through a process of ever
expanding Ohyama-Kemp-Wan customs unions without any country in the
world ever losing.7
More generally, when external tari⁄s are not set at the compensating level,
a free trade agreement or a customs union may, if the rate is set below, lead to
larger desired trade with non-members, or, if the rate is set above, to smaller
desired trade with non-members. Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1991, 1992)
refer to the former case as a complement trade agreement, to the latter as a
substitute trade agreement, and to the case of no spillovers as a neutral trade
7Pravin Krishna and Arvind Panagariya (2002) have derived a similar result for free
trade areas.
15agreement. The case of substitute agreements is, of course, the long-standing
and important concern associated with preferential trade agreements with the
classical problem of non-member exports of products that are similar to a
member country￿ s exports being shut out due to the preference. However,
complementarities may exist between goods produced or consumed within
a preferential trading area and goods provided by non-member countries.
For example, increased production within a customs union or a free trade
area could lead to increased import demand from non-members for inputs
or other goods or services that are complementary in production. And if
a trade agreement is bene￿cial to its member countries, their real income
would increase and, under reasonable assumptions on income propensities to
import, so would desired imports from non-member countries, again leading
to positive spillovers.8
Ayhan Kose and Riezman (2000) show that while customs unions gener-
ally are more bene￿cial for the member countries than are free trade areas,
for non-members the reverse is true. The reason is that the members of a
customs union set tari⁄ policy jointly, i.e. they coordinate, and hence inter-
8In an investigation of liberalization in Latin America in the 1990s, Antoni Estevade-
ordal, Caroline Freund, and Emanuel Ornelas (2008) ￿nd that preferential liberalization
leads to lower external tari⁄s for free trade areas but not for customs unions.
16nalize the bene￿ts of own country tari⁄s for the other member countries who
import the same goods as they do. In a free trade area external tari⁄s are
set independently and members do not take full advantage of their potential
to a⁄ect the terms-of-trade relative to non-members in their favor. Using
numerical simulation methodology, Kose and Riezman (2002) show that a
small country excluded from a customs union by large countries can experi-
ence large losses whereas if the same large countries form a free trade area
the potential losses for the small country are much smaller.
Focusing on free trade areas, Eric Bond, Riezman, and Constantinos Sy-
ropoulos (2004) look at how the formation of a free trade agreement between
countries that set tari⁄s that are welfare-maximizing a⁄ects equilibrium tar-
i⁄s and the welfare of members and nonmembers when the latter also set
their optimal tari⁄s. They show that, at constant nonmember tari⁄s, the
liberalization of internal trade by symmetric members induces them to re-
duce their individually optimal external tari⁄ below the compensating level
thereby causing the outside country￿ s terms of trade to improve and its wel-
fare to rise. If the nonmember country behaves strategically, the formation of
the free trade area leads the nonmember country to behave more aggressively
in its tari⁄ policy. As a consequence, the nonmember country bene￿ts from
17integration even more. The member countries bene￿t only if the free trade
area is su¢ ciently large.
4 Multilateral Trade Agreements
In the world of policy making much economic reform is gradual. The now
over 50-year old process of multilateral liberalization in GATT, and now in
the WTO, seems to proceed at an almost glacial pace and at times to be at
an outright standstill. And when struck agreements, whether multilateral
or preferential, usually specify many years for phasing out internal tari⁄s.
The question of why liberalization is gradual is an interesting one that we
will return to in the next section.
Taking as a constraint that trade agreements must specify gradual changes
in tari⁄s, scholars turned to the question of which formulae for tari⁄ reduc-
tions nations could reasonably agree to in a multilateral negotiation. As-
suming the existence of only trade taxes and the potential for international
sidepayments, Tatsuo Hatta and Takashi Fukushima (1979) use equation (1)
of this paper to investigate the world welfare e⁄ects from two types of reform
that, at various times, have been proposed in various GATT rounds. One
18type of agreement would specify that at each stage of reform the largest tar-
i⁄ be cut to the next highest level, and that this process be repeated until
global free trade has been reached. Hatta and Fukushima show that this so-
called concertina approach would raise world welfare at every stage. They
consider also the proposal that all countries cut their tari⁄s simultaneously
by the same percentage at every stage, and they are able to show that this
so-called radial approach also raises world economic welfare at every stage
of reform if all goods are substitutes.9
What if the initial situation has not only trade taxes but also trade subsi-
dies, as is, for example, the case in agriculture? Kowalczyk (1989) shows that
if rates are ad valorem then it is possible that a radial reduction of tari⁄s and
subsidies may lower world welfare along a segment of the reform path. If,
on the other hand, all rates are speci￿c, then Fukushima and Namdoo Kim
(1989) are able to show that such a welfare paradox is not possible: a radial
reduction of all tari⁄s and subsidies will raise world welfare at every stage of
reform.
It is not only for theoretical convenience but also for practical reasons
that the world welfare or the potential Pareto criterion is important in the
9Ram￿n L￿pez and Arvind Panagariya (1992) consider reform when complementarities
exist in production.
19analysis of trade agreements: the long-standing criterion for agreement in
multilateral negotiations is that any nation or group of nations can block
a proposal and hence prevent an agreement. Put in the language of game
theory, a proposal for a multilateral agreement must be in the core of the
world trade game for that proposal to be implemented.10
Assuming that countries cannot engage in international sidepayments,
Riezman (1985), in a ￿rst application of the core to a multi-country trade
policy game, shows that some countries would prefer to establish free trade
agreements or customs unions rather than agree to global free trade if coun-
tries cannot engage in international sidepayments. Later, Riezman (1999)
uses the same model to argue that trade agreements might help or hinder
the attainment of free trade depending on the size distribution of countries.
In the case of similar sized countries, he shows that if customs unions are not
permitted then free trade is in the core but if countries can form customs
unions then free trade is not in the core. He also looks at another case, one
large and two smaller countries. In this case, if customs unions are allowed
then free trade is not in the core- the large country blocks free trade by
charging a tari⁄and refusing to cooperate. If, however, customs unions were
10The core is the set of allocations that is blocked by no admissible coalition.
20allowed, the large country cannot block free trade and free trade is in the
core. The intuition for this result is that if the two smaller countries can form
a customs union then the large country cannot win a tari⁄ war (because the
two other countries will form a customs union) and hence cannot block free
trade.
Introducing international sidepayments into negotiations of multilateral
agreements, Kowalczyk and Sj￿str￿m (1994, 2000) derive formulae for inter-
national sidepayments that would bring an agreement to eliminate all distor-
tions in a world of monopoly trade into the core. In the standard competitive
model, Konishi, Kowalczyk, and Sj￿str￿m (2009) show that a proposal for
immediate global free trade with a ￿nancial mechanism that compensates any
country for any associated terms-of-trade loss and taxes any country for any
associated terms-of trade gains, is in the core of a world trade policy game
where nations can choose as alternatives either the initial, arbitrary, status
quo or to form Ohyama-Kemp-Wan customs unions. In this case, Ohyama-
Kemp-Wan customs serve as an o⁄-the-equilibrium option that no group of
countries would choose. Ohyama-Kemp-Wan customs unions would never
be observed. Moreover, Konishi, Kowalczyk, and Sj￿str￿m (2003) show that
it is not possible to block any Ohyama-Kemp-Wan customs union with a
21free-trade-with-transfers proposal. In other words, it matters for blocking
what is put on the table. The upshot is that it may be easier to reach free
trade by proposing it outright than by proposing half-way measures.
How large would the international sidepayments be in order to attain free
trade? Thomas Hertel (2000) ￿nds, from calculations derived from the GTAP
model, that those regions of the world that would experience particularly
large e¢ ciency gains (more than two percent of GDP) also would tend to
experience worse terms of trade, and he reports that such terms of trade
losses may be large ￿up to 60% of e¢ ciency gains for some major emerging
market economies. Kowalczyk and Riezman (2007) present estimates of
terms-of-trade e⁄ects from moving from a non-cooperative tari⁄ equilibrium
to global free trade in a CGE-model. For countries whose real income falls
from free trade, the terms-of-trade e⁄ects are so large that they dominate
any positive contribution from the consumption e⁄ects. For countries whose
terms-of-trade improve, such improvements may constitute more than half of
the countries￿total gains from free trade. They also ￿nd, in their examples,
that terms-of-trade e⁄ects from free trade can be up to nine percent of a
nation￿ s GDP, suggesting that the potential side-payments that would lead
to adoption of free trade might be quite large.
225 On Self-Enforcement in Trade Agreements
As we stated at the outset of this paper, the purpose of our focus on the ana-
lytics of economic welfare is to provide a tool that can identify opportunities
for trade agreements that have the potential to raise national income. The
terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade approach allows for assessment of welfare
consequences for all types of reform, multilateral or preferential, gradual or
discrete, and for all nations, whether they participate or are on the sidelines.
This, in turn, de￿nes an opportunity set for agreements in the space of na-
tions￿tari⁄s. A natural question is then to ask which of these many possible
tari⁄ outcomes will actually emerge as an equilibrium. Which agreements
will be struck?
The work and results reported in the previous sections of this paper draw
on the standard, static, competitive, general equilibrium model. For any
trade agreement, the usual strategy in that line of research has been to
assume that national welfare maximizing governments set non-cooperative
Nash tari⁄s on nations that are not parties to the agreement, and set tari⁄s on
trade with partners according to some formula, whether it be zero as required
by Article XXIV for free trade areas and customs unions, or it be some
percentage reduction of initial rates as in the work of gradual multilateral
23reform.
Each of these approaches to the determination of the non-cooperative
and cooperative tari⁄s is subject to di¢ culties. Already early contributors
such as Harry Johnson (1953-54) and William Gorman (1958) show that it
is di¢ cult to solve analytically for the welfare-maximizing non-cooperative
tari⁄ in theoretical work. Later work by Bond (1990), who derives the uni-
lateral optimal tari⁄ with many goods, by Syropoulos (2002), who explores
the determinants of trade elasticities in a two-country, non-cooperative tari⁄
equilibrium, and by Bond and Syropoulos (1996), who consider the optimal
tari⁄ of a trading bloc as a function of its relative size, con￿rm that the
challenges associated with such computations in theoretical work are consid-
erable.
John Kennan and Riezman (1988, 1990) recognized this early and, in their
path-breaking explorations of preferential trade arrangements and free trade,
chose instead to develop a simple computable general equilibrium model with
extensive separability in both supply and demand to obtain equilibrium.
Later-generation computable general equilibrium models, such as the large-
scale GTAP model, do not even seek to solve for optimal tari⁄s but con￿ne
themselves to deriving numerical estimates of the welfare e⁄ects from speci-
24￿ed, formulaic, changes in tari⁄s.11
It is also a challenge to model, and hence to predict, the cooperative
tari⁄s, i.e., the rates nations would establish in trade agreements. Tibor
Scitovsky (1942), Harry Johnson (op. cit.), Wolfgang Mayer (1981), and
Avinash Dixit (1987) showed the di¢ culties of generating free trade or, more
generally, a policy equilibrium on the contract curve, in standard static envi-
ronments where nations use their non-cooperative optimal tari⁄s if no agree-
ments are struck.
And formulaic approaches to the cooperative rates have shortcomings
too. For example, research on free trade areas and customs unions has
usually assumed that partners to such agreements adhere to the letter of
Article XXIV and agree to zero tari⁄s on internal trade. However, this may
not be optimal. For example, already John McMillan and Ewen McCann
(1981) showed that in a three-good model, two customs union partners, even
if small, may prefer an intra-union tari⁄(or subsidy) to internal free trade to
obtain volume-of-trade gains through increased imports from the non-partner
country.
Assuming that trading nations are in a repeated game and that a country
11See, for example, Hertel (op. cit).
25can obtain short-term gains by deviating from an agreed tari⁄but long-term
losses as its trading partner retaliates in subsequent periods, Kyle Bagwell
and Robert Staiger (2002) present ￿ndings on tari⁄s to which nations can
credibly agree under conditions of discounting and su¢ cient similarity of
countries that retaliation eliminates any initial terms-of-trade gains.12 The
framework can also generate paths of gradual tari⁄ changes: For example,
Bagwell and Staiger (1997a) show that if countries agree to form a free trade
area in the future, which they assume is a substitute agreement once it is
fully implemented, the "most cooperative" most-favored-nation tari⁄s will
temporarily increase as soon as the intention of establishing the free trade
agreement has been announced but then ultimately fall back to its initial
value. If, on the other hand, the partner countries agree to form a customs
union then, Bagwell and Staiger (1997b) show, the "most cooperative" most-
favored nation tari⁄path will be U-shaped instead, i.e., the tari⁄falls on the
announcement, but ultimately begins to rise as the customs union partners
will choose to renege on their most-favored-nation tari⁄s as they achieve
12This notion of reciprocity, one that leaves the terms of trade constant, is obviously
restrictive but is analytically tractable. It does not include, for example, the type of reci-
procity between large and small countries discussed in Kowalczyk (2000) and in Kowalczyk
and Donald Davis (1998). Robert Lawrence (1996) and J. Michael Finger (2005) o⁄er
further examples of broader notions of reciprocity. Daniel Kovenock and Marie Thursby
(1992) propose that an additional cost to a country from deviation is that it loses credibility
and hence reduced ability to enter into future agreements.
26increased market power once their tari⁄s have been fully harmonized in the
customs union. Benjamin Zissimos (2007) shows that if the deviation from
the initial agreed tari⁄ is small, and if the punishment is limited, then trade
liberalization must be gradual and free trade will not be reached since, in
the absence of severe punishment, only the promise of further liberalization
will prevent deviation in the present, but at free trade this promise cannot
be made.
Another approach to generating the gradual phasing out of tari⁄s has
been to introduce assumptions on production. For example, Michael Dev-
ereux (1997) considers learning-by-doing by export ￿rms, Taiji Furusawa and
Edwin Lai (1999) assume adjustment costs for labor when moving between
sectors, and Bond and Jee-Hyeong Park (2002) and Richard Chisik (2003)
consider the role of irreversible investment as proposed by John McLaren
(1997).
6 Conclusion and Further Research
The area of trade agreements is obviously very large and one of much cur-
rent research. We have focused in this review on research on the welfare
27economics of trade agreements and on research on self-enforcing trade agree-
ments. Results from the former literature identi￿es opportunities for coop-
eration and new combinations of policies that may yield outcomes that are
welfare superior to existing policies or institutions. The results on sidepay-
ments are the most obvious example. This line of research usually assumes
a standard many-good, many-agent general equilibrium environment, which
may make it di¢ cult to o⁄er strong predictions. The work on self-enforcing
agreements has o⁄ered results that help identify which policies and hence
agreements would reasonably be observed. These results are often derived
under restrictive assumptions, for example, two or three goods or countries,
or explicit functional forms.
The two literatures are obviously complementary. Indeed, as is known
from the theory of mechanism design, it is useful to apply cooperative ap-
proaches to identify outcomes that are "desirable" according to some speci￿ed
criterion and then to use non-cooperative approaches to explore whether it
is possible to implement, at least approximately, these "desirable" outcomes.
Free trade is a "desirable" outcome in the work on trade agreements for fun-
damental welfare economic reasons. We have reported how international
sidepayments may be helpful to achieve this outcome. It is an interesting
28question how a ￿nancial mechanism would look if it had to be self-enforcing.
We have also reported on results on formulaic approaches to welfare-
improving liberalization. It would be interesting to explore whether these
formulae, in particular the ones specifying equi-proportionate and concertina
approaches to rate reductions, can be generated as equilibrium paths in ne-
gotiations between optimizing governments.
It has been established in the literature that free trade can be attained if
customs unions do not exert spillovers onto non-member countries. Could
a proposal to revise Article XXIV to require that customs unions do not
result in spillovers to non-member countries be agreed by the members of
the WTO?
The work reported in this paper also has implications for CGE modeling
of trade policy. As our understanding of policy setting improves, it would
be useful if such models incorporated elements of endogenous policy setting
and reaction. The technical di¢ culties to do so may still be prohibitive but
the return would be a "realistic" model for world trade where policies adjust
to underlying shocks. An important input into that project would be the
work on political economy of trade policy, another area of active research
that space limitations have prevented us from discussing in this paper.
29Finally, the terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade approach presented here
should facilitate empirical research on trade agreements by casting the analy-
sis in terms of standard economic variables that, in principle, can be esti-
mated: the levels and changes in trade volumes, world market prices, and
tari⁄ rates.13
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